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A. Torts: Protection of Personal Rights
1. Right of Privacy
2. Defamation
B. Contracts
1. Violation of a Non-Competition Covenant
a. Waiver of "Clean Hands" Doctrine
b. Reasonableness as to Time and Territory
II. PRAMCTCE AND PROCEDURE
A. Motion to Dismiss
1. Complainants Right to Dismiss Without Prejudice
2. Effect of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
B. Demurrer: Multifariousness
1. Improper Joinder of Actions in Proceedings for Correction of
Errors
C. Amendment
1. Right of Amendment after Dismissal
D. Declaratory Judgment
1. Application of "Clean Hands" Doctrine
III. BEviEw OF AimuR ISThIE ACTION
A large number of decisions were reported in 1964 in cases originat-
ing in the chancery courts but only one appears to establish a signifi-
cant rule; the others largely clear up procedural problems of equity
practice.
I. INJUNCION
A. Torts: Protection of Personal Rights
1. Violation of the Right of Privacy.-In 1956 in the case of Lang-
ford v. Vanderbilt University,1 the Tennessee Supreme Court recog-
nized the existence of a common law right of privacy. The Court of
Appeals, Western Division, in Kyritsis v. Vieron,2 now holds that
injunction does not lie to protect a personal right.
The suit arose in the chancery court of Shelby County. Complainant
* Associate Professor of Law, Memphis State University.
1. 199 Tenn. 389, 287 S.W.2d 32 (1956).
2. 382 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1964).
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alleged he was pastor of the Saint George's Greek Orthodox Church
affiliated with the Greek Orthodox Church of North America and
Canada, and that defendant was pastor of the Church of the Annun-
ciation affiliated with the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and
South America. Complaint charged defendant with publishing to the
community at large and to complainant's parishioners and others in
particular a letter from defendant's archbishop that complainant had
been unfrocked from that denomination, and further charged that
defendant had represented complainant to be unworthy of member-
ship in the Ministerial Association of Memphis. The complainant
withdrew his request for damages so as to leave the sole question
whether or not injunction would issue. The case was heard on oral
evidence and depositions and the chancellor dismissed as he con-
sidered the issues to turn on the determination of ecclesiastical ques-
tions. On appeal, complainant assigned as the sole error that the
lower court failed to grant appellant an injunction restraining appellee
from further libel and slander, and in dismissing his bill.
In the court of appeals decision, Judge Bejach quoted from Ameri-
can Jurisprudence,3 that equity in the absence of some independent
grounds would not grant an injunction restraining the publication of
matter defaming the plaintiff personally, the principal grounds of
refusal being equity's traditional limitation of jurisdiction to the
protection of property rights and the fear that such relief will violate
the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and press, and of trial
by jury. The court also held that to determine whether defendant
was justified in publishing and circulating the letter it would be
necessary to pass on the ecclesiastical actions and decisions of the
Greek Orthodox Church and that the courts of Tennessee are without
power to do so.
Since Lord Eldon, in Gee v. Prichard,4 remarked that the issuance
of an injunction would not turn upon pain to feelings but upon
"whether the bill has stated facts of which the Crown can take notice,
as a case of civil property which it is bound to protect," American
courts and writers have adopted the requirements of a property
interest as a requisite for injunctive relief. During the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, courts have extended the range of protectable
property interest permitting injunction to become increasingly availa-
ble to protect what had been previously considered personal rights.
Some jurisdictions have rejected the rule outright. Statutes have been
important in the undermining and repudiation of the rule.5 A variety
3. 28 Am.. JuR Iniunctions § 133 (1938).
4. 2 Swan Ch. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
5. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 3Q Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947).
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of reasons have been suggested why injunctive relief should not lie,
including the public interest in free speech.6 Before granting an
injunction, the court must balance the need of complainant, the
interest of the defendant in publishing his ideas, and the interest
of the community in having information upon which it may base
actions.
The majority American rule is that equity will not enjoin libel or
slander. The English courts long ago rejected this rule. In England,
an injunction will issue upon request of the plaintiff after a jury
determination of guilt. The American courts have recognized the
inadequacy of the legal remedy, but have generally held that granting
an injunction would violate the defendant's and the community in-
terest in free speech.
7
In a federal district court case in Tennessee,8 the court said:
Generally equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the uttering of a slander or
the writing of libel, but equity may issue injunction if the slander or libel
is in bad faith, for the sole purpose of injuring the trade of the person
defamed.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in a licensing case had indicated that
an injunction would issue for the protection of any right, legal or
equitable, upon proper application to chancery court unless the legal
remedy of compensatory damages would be full, adequate, and com-
plete.9
Judge Bejach and the chancellor cited Nance v. Busby,10 as depriv-
ing the civil courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate any ecclesiastical
matter. That was a suit to determine right to the possession of. a
church building after a schism in the congregation and excommunica-
tion of the complainants. The supreme court in reversing the decree in
favor of complainants held the church alone had the right to determine
the validity of its actions in excluding complainants and as the actions
claimed to forfeit defendants' rights to the property occurred after the
excommunications, the complainants had no right in the property.
The court might have affirmed Kyritsis v. Vieron narrowly on the
grounds that the denial of injunction was within the chancellor's
discretion;" that there was a full, adequate and complete remedy at
law;' 2 that defendant was within the scope of privilege in that de-
6. Praucha v. Weiss, 233 Md. 479, 197 A.2d 253, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 992 (1964).
7. Kwass v. Kersey, 139 W. Va. 497, 81 S.E.2d 237 (1954).
8. Starnes v. Success Portrait Co., 28 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Tenn. 1939).
9. Wise v. McCanless, 183 Tenn. 107, 191 S.W.2d 169 (1946).
10. 91 Tenn. 303 (1892).
11. Spencer v. O'Brien, 25 Tenn. App. 429, 158 S.W.2d 445 (E.S. 1942).




fendant's acts were not for the sole purpose of injuring the complain-
ant;13 or that public policy in this circumstance would favor full and
free disclosure.14 It was not necessary to hold that an injunction will
not issue to restrain a libel or to pass on the actions and decisions of
the ecclesiastical court in order to decide the case. The question was
not whether publishing a letter stating a priest was unfrocked was a
libel, but whether defendant was maliciously circulating the letter
outside the area of privilege in an unwarranted invasion of complain-
ants privacy in his personal and professional life for which invasion
damages would not be full, adequate and complete remedy.
Injunctions in defamation and right of privacy cases do not neces-
sarily involve the danger to public interest that censorship by a
continuing agency does. The defendant is not called on to justify his
statement any more than in a damage action although plaintiff may
find it easier as it is not necessary to prove substantial injury. The
increasing judicial willingness to enjoin business defamation indi-
cates recognition that defendant's protection against restraint of
speech is not controlling. Where the danger to plaintiff's reputation
is great and the public interest is minimal, it is difficult to see why
an injunction should not issue where trial by jury is available to reflect
community opinion.
The case illustrates well the difficulties courts have had in develop-
ing the right of privacy 15 and demonstrates the need for legislation
to protect the right of privacy by issue of injunction after jury trial.
The Tennessee case of Kivett v. Nevils,16 and the West Virginia case of
Kwass v. Kersey 7 illustrate the problem. In the Kivett case, com-
plainant alleged he was being maliciously libeled by exhibition of a
forged letter offering settlement of a threatened lawsuit based on
illicit relations with a ffteen-year-old girl. In Kwass, complainant, an
attorney, alleged he was being injured in his profession by the false
assertion he had overreached a wife in negotiating the property settle-
ment in a divorce case in which he represented the husband. In both
cases, injunctive relief was denied.
B. Contracts
1. Violation of a Non-Competition Covenant.-In Federal Mutual
Implement & Hardware Insurance Co. v. Johnson,18 the Court of
Appeals, Eastern District, reversed a decree of the chancery court
13. Starnes v. Success Portrait Co., supra note 8.
14. Praucha v. Weiss, supra note 6.
15. HAiT & SAcGs, THE LEcAL PRocEss, 472-77 (Tentative ed. 1958).
16. Kivett v. Nevils, suprd note 12.
17. Supra note 7.
18. 382 S.W.2d 214 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1964).
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of Washington County holding complainants barred from enforcing
the no-competition covenant of employment contract because they
came into court with "unclean hands." The lower court had ruled
against the complainant because it had breached its promise to give
defendant an exclusive territory. Judge Bejach, for the court, held
complainant not barred, since the defendant had failed to complain
when he learned of another salesman in his exclusive territory, had
thus effectively waived strict performance.
The decision reaffirmed the earlier case of Federated Mutual Imple-
ment & Hardware Co. v. Anderson,19 holding the limitations as to time
and territory were reasonable. 20
II. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. Motion To Dismiss
1. Complainant's Right To Dismiss Without Prejudice.-National
Linen Service Corp. v. Teichnor21 clears up the apparent conflict
between Roberts v. N. C. & St. L. Ry.22 and Shelton v. Armstrong,23
as to a complainant's right to dismiss without prejudice. Justice
Dyer, for the court, overruled Roberts holding the chancellor is
vested with discretion as to whether complainant may dismiss with-
out prejudice. Roberts and Shelton were distinguishable by the
presence of an agreement to try the case on a day certain and the
trial court could have affirmed on that limited question, but they
chose this vehicle to clear up the question. On the second question,
whether the chancellor abused his discretion, no facts are given on
which comment may be made.
2. Effect of Defendant's Motion To Dismiss.-Use of a motion to
dismiss at the close of complainant's proof to test its sufficiency was
disapproved on Hon v. Varnell,2 but the refusal of the chancellor to
allow defendants to introduce any proof after ruling on the motion
was held to be error. The opinion held the motion to dismiss in
equity analogous to a motion for directed verdict in law rather than
a demurrer to the evidence and the defendant is not entitled to a
ruling on his motion until he rests his case.
B. Demurrer: Multifariousness
1. Improper Joinder of Actions in Proceeding for Correction of
19. 49 Tenn. App. 124, 351 S.W.2d 411 (E.S. 1961).
20. Two years in six counties.
21. 374 S.W.2d 377 (Tenn. 1964).
22. 6 Ct. Civ. App. 149 (1915).
23. 25 Tenn. App. 305, 156 S.W.2d 447 (M.S. 1945).
24. 382 S.W.2d 535 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1964).
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Errors.-The City of Knoxville sought to set aside a default decree
in a twenty-seven-year-old action to establish complainant's title to
street or to recover compensation. The city sought relief on the dual
grounds that complainant was not entitled to relief and that there was
a prior settlement. The complainant demurred that the bill of
review was in double aspect (1) for error apparent, and (2) to
impeach for fraud; the chancellor overruled the demurrer and com-
plainant appealed. The supreme court, by Judge Felts, reversed,25
holding that the bill of review should have been dismissed, that though
complainants might not be given possession of the street, they were
entitled to damages for the taking.
C. Amendment
1. Right of Amendment after Dismissal.-In a case of first impres-
sion26 in the state, the supreme court upheld the chancellor's exercise
of discretion in refusing to allow complainant to amend further after
ruling on demurrer that complainant's bill should be dismissed. The
principal question concerned the right of a judgment creditor to pro-
ceed against judgment debtor's insurer for bad faith to settle within
policy limits and to recover the excess of the judgment above the
policy limits. The court held no harm resulted to the judgment
creditor from insurer's refusal to settle,2 7 and that insured's cause
of action was not assignable, being an action ex delicto.2
D. Declaratory Judgment
1. Application of "Clean Hands" Doctrine.-The decision in Hogue
v. Kroger,2 9 put an end to the fresh milk "price war" in Shelby County
where milk had been selling as low as nine cents per half-gallon.
The dispute involved the interpretation of the Unfair Milk Sales Act.30
Complainant objected to defendants' giving trading stamps with milk,
reduced his cash price to meet defendant's price less value of stamps,
and filed a declaratory judgment action for determination of his right
under the statute to do so. The Commissioner of Agriculture filed
a cross-bill seeking an injunction against complainant's price reduc-
tion, and the chancellor denied the injunction.31 Defendants denied
25. Emory v. City of Knoxville, 379 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1964).
26. Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 381 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. 1964).
27. Complainant offered to settle for $3,000; after refusal to settle, complainant
recovered judgment for $7,500 on which insurer paid policy limits of $5,250, a gain
of $2,250.
28. Came v. Maryland Cas. Co., 208 Tenn. 403, 346 S.W.2d 259 (1961).
29. 373 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 1964).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 52-331, -334 (1956).
31. Hogue v. Kroger Co., 210 Tenn. 1, 356 S.W.2d 267 (1962).
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complainant's right to relief because of his participation in the price
cutting. The chancellor granted the requested declaratory decree
that (a) merchants who give stamps with fresh milk must raise their
price by the value of the stamps, and (b) upon their failure to do
so competitors may reduce prices in good faith to meet the com-
petition. On appeal, the supreme court modified and affirmed, hold-
ing that the "clean hands" defense is not available in a declaratory
judgment action, that merchants who give stamps must raise the price
of milk the value of the stamps, and that competitors who cannot in
good faith meet competitor's unlawful low prices but must seek the
relief provided by statute. The last qualification may prove a real
burden on dealers in ascertaining the lawfulness of competitor's low
prices before meeting competition. The court refused the analogy of
trading stamps to "fair trade" pricing, which raises new problems
of uniform enforcement for manufacturers selling their fair traded
products through retailers, some of whom give trading stamps.
III. REvmw OF ADmINIST.RATIvE ACTION
Two interesting statutory interpretation questions were decided in
cases which came to the chancery courts by writ of certiorari to re-
view administrative determinations. In the case of Adams v. County
Beer Bd.,32 the supreme court held that a baptismal site located on
petitioner's property and subject to his right to forbid its use was
not a public place within the meaning of the licensing statute.33 In
a more important case, the court of appeals reversed the chancellor's
holding that the Tennessee Real Estate Commission had no right to
disqualify a real estate broker for acts not done in his capacity as a
broker.3 The court, by Judge Shriver, interpreted the statute35 as
allowing revocation of license for fraudulent dealings in real estate
though not done in the capacity of a real estate broker.
32. 379 S.W.2d 769 (Tenn. 1964).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-205 (1956).
34. Real Estate Comm'n v. Godwin, 378 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1964).
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-1301 (1956).
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